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I. INTRODUCTION
“I’ll always be here for you. I promise I’ll bring you home.”1 That was the
promise made by Peggy Fugate to her little girl as the girl sat crying on her mother’s
lap in a courtroom.2 Despite extensive effort on her part, Peggy was unable to make
good on the promise that she made to her daughter. Peggy fought her way through
the legal system, never giving up on fulfilling her promise, but the Ohio Supreme
Court shattered her dream of protecting her little girl.3
In the courtroom that day, Selina McBride was taken from the custody of her
mother,4 a decision which Peggy did not fight, “believing her daughter would be
adopted into a clean, stable home . . . .”5 Unfortunately, little Selina, now sixteen,
never found her way to a stable home.6 She has been shuffled among foster homes
and finally landed in a group home.7 Life for Selina has been anything but stable.8
Instability has led Selina down the wrong path in her young life. At sixteen, she
already has had trouble with the police.9 She has run away from her foster home
1
Sharon Coolidge, Mom Wants to Adopt Daughter She Lost, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct.
28, 2004, at 1A [hereinafter Coolidge, Daughter She Lost].
2

Id.

3
See In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2006), rev’g 817 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio Ct. App.
2004). The Ohio Supreme Court held that Peggy was statutorily barred from moving for
custody of her daughter after her parental rights had been terminated by the state. Id. at 47.
4

Id. at 44.

5

Coolidge, Daughter She Lost, supra note 1.

6

In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 44.

7

Id.

8

See generally Sharon Coolidge, Remade Life Not Enough for Custody, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, July 20, 2006, at 1A [hereinafter Coolidge, Remade Life].
9

Id.
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numerous times.10 The lack of a stable home life threatens to turn Selina into the
type of person her mother once was—the very result the court intended to prevent by
taking Selina from Peggy’s care.
Nobody would argue that the Peggy Fugate who made that promise to her
daughter deserved to retain custody of her child. The old Peggy was a crack addict
and had been “in and out of prison.”11 She had multiple children taken from her care
because of neglect.12 But people can change,13 and that is exactly what Peggy did.14
After nearly a decade of perseverance, Peggy turned her life around.15 Peggy is
now in a happy and stable marriage; she works a full-time job and lives in an
apartment with a spare bedroom.16 After straightening out her life, Peggy began to
dream about reuniting with her daughter, knowing that she finally had the ability to
be a good mother.17 The Juvenile Court has allowed Selina to visit with her mother,
even allowing a few overnight visits, and Peggy has turned her spare bedroom into a
room for Selina.18 Peggy has begun to develop and nurture a relationship with her
daughter, a relationship of a nature that Selina has never experienced—a loving,
parental presence.19
The new Peggy discovered that her little girl was still bouncing around the foster
care system and living in a group home;20 no mother wants that for her child. So,
Peggy entered the court system to seek custody of her child21 in a process that, she
argued, should be analogous to adoption.22 “All I want to do is hug her and tell her
how much I love her[,]”23 she said when initiating the proceeding. Peggy met early
success, with both the Juvenile Court and the Court of Appeals ruling that she was
10

Id.

11

Coolidge, Remade Life, supra note 8.

12

Id.

13

In re McBride, 817 N.E.2d 459, 461 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 850 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio
2006) (“[O]ur court/justice/legal/moral system supposes that people can change.”). The
appellate court would have allowed Fugate the opportunity to have a best interests hearing in
the trial court to determine if Selina should be returned to Fugate’s custody. Id. at 462.
14

See generally Coolidge, Remade Life, supra note 8.

15

Id.

16

Coolidge, Daughter She Lost, supra note 1 (“Fugate . . . is now drug-free, married, and
working full time . . . .”); Coolidge, Remade Life, supra note 8 (stating that Selina has a
bedroom at Fugate’s apartment).
17

Coolidge, Remade Life, supra note 8.

18

Id.

19

See generally id.

20
In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ohio 2006), rev’g 817 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio Ct. App.
2004).
21

Id.

22

Coolidge, Remade Life, supra note 8.

23

Sharon Coolidge, After Seven Years, a Reunion, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 30, 2004,
at 3B.
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able at least to present an argument regarding her child’s best interests.24 Sadly, the
Ohio Supreme Court delivered the news that Ohio law, as written, prevented Peggy
from becoming a permanent part of her daughter’s life and rescuing her from the
system that has failed her for so many years, without regard to what might be in
Selina’s best interests.25
The law relied upon by the Ohio Supreme Court mandates the outcome in this
case.26 It does not, however, serve the purpose the State is supposed to serve in cases
dealing with children. The Ohio Revised Code is riddled with references to the “best
interests of the child,”27 but the sections of the statutes relied upon by the Ohio
Supreme Court in deciding McBride are oddly silent in that regard.28 Protecting
children has always been of paramount importance in the courts as well,29 but the
statute controls the outcome.30
The statute must be amended to allow the courts to protect the best interest of the
children for whom they are in place to serve, even if this means that occasionally a
parent who was once adjudged to be incapable of caring for her child, and whose
rights were subsequently terminated, may be the best, and often only, option to save
that child from the dangers of the foster care system.
24

In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 44.

25

See id. at 47.

26

See infra Part III.

27

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1717.14, 2105.26, 2111.05, 2151.141, 2151.3521,
2151.36, 2151.412, 3105.21, 3107.161, 5103.153, 5103.16 (LexisNexis 2007).
28

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(F). The subsection of the statute reads as follows:
The parents of a child for whom the court has issued an order granting permanent
custody pursuant to this section, upon the issuance of the order, cease to be parties
to the action. This division is not intended to eliminate or restrict any right of the
parents to appeal the granting of permanent custody of their child to a movant
pursuant to this section.
Id. The Ohio Supreme Court interpreted this as a procedural fault in Peggy Fugate’s attempt
to regain custody of her daughter. In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 45-46. See also OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.353(E)(2) (LexisNexis 2007). The text of this subsection reads as follows:
Any public children services agency, any private child placing agency, the department
of job and family services, or any party, other than any parent whose parental rights
with respect to the child have been terminated pursuant to an order issued under
division (A)(4) of this section, by filing a motion with the court, may at any time
request the court to modify or terminate any order of disposition issued pursuant to
division (A) of this section or section 2151.414 [2151.41.4] or 2151.415 [2151.41.5]
of the Revised Code. The court shall hold a hearing upon the motion as if the hearing
were the original dispositional hearing and shall give all parties to the action and the
guardian ad litem notice of the hearing pursuant to the Juvenile Rules. If applicable,
the court shall comply with section 2151.42 of the Revised Code.
Id. The Ohio Supreme Court read this provision as a bar to Peggy Fugate’s attempt to
regain custody of her daughter. In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 46-47.
29
See, e.g., In re Cunningham, 391 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Ohio 1979) (“[It is] the timehonored precedent in this state that the ‘best interests’ of the child are the primary
consideration in questions of possession or custody of children.”).
30

In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 47.
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Part II of this Note will explore the dangers of exposure to the foster care system,
illustrate why we need to protect children from prolonged exposure to the system,
and highlight Ohio’s performance when it comes to permanency planning for
children within the system. Part III will explain the statutory framework on which
this decision was based and shed more light on the problem created by this decision,
as well as present a comparative analysis of how other jurisdictions handle this
problem in their respective statutes. Part IV will look to relevant case law for an
understanding of the tradition in Ohio’s courts of protecting the “best interests” of
children, as well as an analysis of the Ohio Supreme Court’s reasoning in McBride.
In Part V, a solution to this problem will be proposed. Finally, Part VI will
conclude.
II. THE ILL EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM
The effects of an extended stay in the foster care system can be devastating and
long lasting.31 The story of Selina McBride is illustrative of many of these problems,
problems resulting from the failures of the system; Selina is not alone in this
regard.32 A plethora of studies have produced similar results regarding the negative
impact that exposure to the foster care system has on the children it is supposedly in
place to serve and protect, 33 some of which will be discussed below. Also, as the
foster care system becomes more dangerous the longer a child is exposed to it,
discussion will follow regarding data that will help to understand how long children
tend to stay in the foster care system and, more specifically, in the final section, how
long Ohio children who have parental rights terminated are apt to stay in the system
prior to finalization, as well as a comparison of how these numbers compare to the
rest of the United States.
A. Real Examples of the Dangers Posed by Exposure to the Foster Care System
An examination will show that the foster care system is far from the safehaven
many believe it to be. To the extent that it is intended to provide a safer home than
that from which the affected children come, it probably is successful in the majority
of cases. However, if the goal is to provide a good, safe home for these children,
then it has probably failed overall. The story of Selina McBride highlights some of
the shortcomings of the system, and there do exist many other stories that reinforce
this view that the foster care system is not necessarily the place of refuge it is
intended to be.

31

See generally Deborah A. Martin-Grissom, Foster Care Adolescents: Examining
Perceptions of a Model Resiliency and Life-Skills Training Program 30-45 (May, 2005)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cleveland State University) (on file with Cleveland State
University Library) (setting forth a plethora of studies regarding the negative effects of the
foster care system on children).
32

See, e.g., RICHARD ENGLAND, DISPLACED CHILDREN IN CRISIS—OUR ENABLING SYSTEM
BEHAVIOR (2001). Dr. England recounts the stories of multiple children in the
foster care system, ranging from an infant to teenagers. Id. His stories shed light on the
atrocities that unfortunately are commonplace in the foster care system, atrocities stemming
from bureaucratic inefficiency to physical and emotional abuse and beyond. Id.
FOR HIGH RISK

33

See generally Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, at 30-45.
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1. The System Has Failed Selina
Selina’s experience in the foster care system has been anything but ideal.
Hamilton County Ohio Job and Family Services took custody of Selina at the age of
seven with the intent of finding a permanent placement for her with an adoptive
family.34 Peggy Fugate did not fight this outcome, because she believed that “her
daughter would be adopted into a clean, stable home—one [she] was unable to
provide.”35 Both Peggy and the agency were wrong.36 Selina has bounced through
the system for seven years, finding temporary placement in a number of institutions
and foster homes, never with any sign of permanence. 37 Selina has stated that she
does not wish to go through the adoption process.38 At the time the Supreme Court
denied Peggy the right to petition for custody of her daughter, Selina was living in a
group home, from which she often ran away, and had been in trouble with the
police.39
Obviously, life has been hard on Selina.40 The system that she entered for
protection has failed to protect her from the cruelties of the world.41 Something was
not working right; the same something is wrong for too many of the children in the
foster care system.
2. Selina Is Not Alone
The foster care system lets countless children down each and every day. The
problems are certainly not specific to Ohio. They plague the foster care systems of
all of the states in this country and around the world. What follows are some
illustrative examples of how dangerous this system can be and why any opportunity
to allow a child to break free should at least be considered in light of that child’s best
interests.
One such story is relayed in a book written by Dr. Richard England.42 Dr.
England conveys the story of Dill, a ten-year-old boy who had the mind of a twoyear-old.43 The boy entered foster care as an infant and worked his way through the
system, further and further from his biological relatives.44 All of the evidence
indicated a history of sexual and physical abuse at a young age, rendering the boy

34

See In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 44.

35

Coolidge, Daughter She Lost, supra note 1.

36

See generally Coolidge, Remade Life, supra note 8.

37

In re McBride, 817 N.E.2d 459, 460 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 850 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio
2006).
38

Id.

39

Coolidge, Remade Life, supra note 8.

40

See id.

41

See id.

42

ENGLAND, supra note 32.

43

Id. at 29.

44

Id.
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essentially mute.45 Dill was acting out in school; he threw feces at any person who
approached him and attacked the other children, which in turn led to Dill’s forced
internment in a state psychiatric hospital.46 While in the hospital, Dill received
twenty-four-hour care and extensive treatment, and the results were readily visible in
his behavior.47 However, between the newfound smiles and communication, a new
behavioral change occurred—attachment, only not to a family, but to “certain of the
hospital state.”48 His behavioral progress led to placement with a foster family;
within three weeks the boy was back in the hospital.49 Apparently, the state’s
eagerness to place the child in the home had resulted in shoddy background checks
and the boy was placed in the care of persons who had not been fully investigated.50
The foster parents had stopped his medication and neglected him, possibly even
physically abusing the boy.51 They found Dill walking naked down the street,
muttering, crying and with no sense of where he was.52
Dr. England provides another case study that is illustrative of many of the
problems plauging the foster care system. Cliff was sixteen and had been in over
twenty foster care placements due to “severely disordered conduct.”53 Cliff had
“poor impulse control, an extreme level of defiance, and . . . engaged in self-abusive
behavior.”54 He came from a violent and dysfunctional family, having witnessed his
father abusing his mother and hated them both for it.55 When approached by a
psychologist, however, Cliff opened up to reveal an unexpected inner beauty,
expressing his love for history, politics and current events as well as his impressive
chess skills.56 Cliff asked to be released, but the psychologist spoke with the boy’s
mother first.57 The mother revealed her fear that Cliff would follow through with the
threats he had made on her life previously, and she knew that he was able to do so.58
The psychologist did not recommend that Cliff be released, so he escaped from the

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id. at 29-30.

49

Id. at 30.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 48.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 48-49.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 49.

58

Id.
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prison that the state had made his home and moved in with his friends.59 The mother
simply got a notice that he was at large.60
The stories of Dill and Cliff are probably extreme examples, certainly more so
than that of Selina McBride above, yet they are effective examples of how the
system fails the children for whom it is in place to serve. Dill spent his life looking
for a permanent home to which he could attach himself.61 He did not find this home
in an adoptive or foster family, but in a state mental hospital.62 Then, the state
arranged for him to be taken from this place that he finally felt was home and to be
placed into the home of people it had failed to investigate, people who caused
irreparable damage to the poor boy.63 Dill needed special care due to his unique
disabilities, and instead, he was given the first care that came along.64
Cliff, on the other hand, represents a different failure of the system, a failure to
help a child find closure from his old life and to begin anew in another.65 Cliff was
caught up in the violence of his biological family and was unable to find happiness in
any placement, even with his mother.66 The system must help to bring families
together—even if those families are not biologically related.
B. Problems Commonly Occurring in Children in Foster Care
Many studies have been conducted to determine the effects of the foster care
system on the children for whom it is in place to protect.67 The results in the lives of
Selina, Dill, and Cliff would probably come as little or no surprise to most of the
researchers who have done these studies. The dangers posed to children in the foster
care system, the lack of proper medical care for children in the foster care system,
59

Id. at 50.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 29-30.

62

Id. at 29.

63

Id. at 29-30.

64

Id. at 30.

65

See generally id. at 48-49.

66

Id.

67

See, e.g., Lily T. Alpert, Research Review: Parents' Service Experience—A Missing
Element in Research on Foster Care Case Outcomes, 10 CHILD & FAM. SOC. WORK 361
(2005); Bridgett A. Besinger et al., Caregiver Substance Abuse Among Maltreated Children
Placed in Out-of-Home Care, 78 CHILD WELFARE 221 (1999); Bilha Davidson-Arad et al.,
Why Social Workers Do Not Implement Decisions to Remove Children at Risk from Home, 27
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 687 (2003); Laurel K. Leslie et al., Foster Care and Medicaid
Managed Care, 82 CHILD WELFARE 367 (2003); Theresa McNichol & Constance Tash,
Parental Substance Abuse and the Development of Children in Family Foster Care, 80 CHILD
WELFARE 239 (2001); Donna D. Petras et al., Overcoming Hopelessness and Social Isolation:
The ENGAGE Model for Working with Neglecting Families Toward Permanence, 81 CHILD
WELFARE 225 (2002); Heather N. Taussig et al., Children Who Return Home from Foster
Care: A 6-Year Prospective Study of Behavioral Health Outcomes in Adolescence, 108
PEDIATRICS E10 (2001); Jenni Ward, Substance Use Among Young People 'Looked After' by
Social Services, 5 DRUGS: EDUC., PREVENTION AND POL’Y 257 (1998).
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and the short-term and long-term psychological effects of exposure to the foster care
system are more than evident.68
1. The Dangers of the Foster Care System
One author writes that there is no way of knowing how many children in the
foster care system are abused and neglected and posits that the problem is more
widespread than many believe it to be.69 Children in the foster care system “have
been reported severely beaten and killed[,]” as well as being subjected to bizarre
punishments, sexual abuse, and parental neglect.70 The author cites one national
study which indicates that rates of abuse in the foster care system may be more than
ten times the rates of abuse for children in the general population.71 Furthermore, the
system fails to protect children by failing to report these abuses—one study showed
that as much as 63% of cases of suspected abuse were not reported by one state
agency.72 Further agency failure is evinced by reports that 43% of children were
placed in “an unsuitable foster home,” and 57% of children in the system “were at
serious risk of harm while in foster care.”73
2. The Lack of Good Medical Care for Children in the Foster Care System
While all children are certainly in need of medical care, children in foster care
have a greater need for medical care due to their generally lower health than any
other group of children in the United States.74 Common problems found by
researchers included children who had not received vaccinations and children who
had not even received medical examinations upon entry into the foster care system;

68

See, e.g., supra note 67.

69

Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster
Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 199, 205 (1988). As Deborah
Martin-Grissom points out, physical abuse can be very dangerous: “Research also shows that
being a victim of child abuse may result in antisocial behavior, depression, withdrawn
behavior, and inappropriate sexual behavior.” Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, at 31 (citation
omitted).
70
Mushlin, supra note 69 at 205. For a recent incident of foster care abuse in Ohio, see
Mark Puente, Neighbor Testifies Against Gravelle, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 6, 2006,
at B4. This article tells some of the details of the story of the Gravelles, foster parents who
were found guilty of a number of charges, including locking their foster children in what were
essentially cages. Id.
71

Mushlin, supra note 69, at 206. Martin-Grissom notes that: “According to the American
Academy of Pediatrics (2000), of the more than 500,000 children in foster care in the United
States, most have been victims of repeated abuse and prolonged neglect and have not
experienced a nurturing, stable environment during the early years of life.” Martin-Grissom,
supra note 31, at 39.
72

Mushlin, supra note 69, at 207.

73

Id.

74

Id. at 208. Martin-Grissom agrees with this sentiment: “Children in foster care also are
likely to suffer from a range of acute and chronic physical health problems.” Martin-Grissom,
supra note 31, at 42 (citation omitted).
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those who did receive an examination often received an incomplete examination.75
Masses of children in the foster care system are in need of vision and dental care—
but the system does not provide this for them.76
3. Short-Term Psychological Effects of Exposure to the Foster Care System
The immediate psychological effects of exposure to the foster care system are
devastating. One study indicates that as many as 90% of children in the foster care
system suffer from mental health problems warranting clinical intervention.77
Specifically, high rates of attachment disorders plague children in foster care due to
the inability of the children in the system to develop the necessary bonds with their
caregivers when they are jumping from place to place.78 Another study reveals high
rates of “involvement in juvenile crime and prostitution, mental and physical health
problems, poor educational and employment outcomes, inadequate social support
75
Mushlin, supra note 69, at 208. Martin-Grissom found the following problems to be
common among children in foster care: “upper respiratory infections, dermatologic disorders,
dental caries, and malnutrition.” Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, at 42 (citation omitted).
76

Mushlin, supra note 69, at 208-09; Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, at 42 (“[C]hildren in
[foster] care, when compared to children not in care, were found to have higher rates of vision,
hearing, growth, and dental problems.”) (citation omitted).
77

Susan Vig et al., Young Children in Foster Care: Multiple Vulnerabilities and Complex
Service Needs, 18 INFANTS & YOUNG CHILD. 147, 151 (2005). Martin-Grissom discusess the
widespread nature of psychological problems in children in the foster care system:
In a research study conducted by Clausen et al. (1996), behavior problems in the
clinical and borderline range were observed in foster children at a rate of two and a
half times that expected in a community population. These researchers also noted that
75 to 80 percent of foster children received scores either in the clinical or borderline
range on one or both of the behavior problem and social competence domains. In a
similar study, McIntyre and Kessler (1998), report that 61% of the clinically
disordered foster children in their sample manifested multi-symptom syndromes.
....
. . . Research documents that overall, adolescents in foster care have been exposed to a
multitude of adverse conditions and stressors, which may place them at risk for
developing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and substance abuse disorders.
Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, at 31, 45 (emphasis added).
78
Vig et al., supra note 77, at 151. Children affected by attachment disorders display the
following characteristics:
Children with insecure/ambivalent attachment are markedly distressed during
separation and, upon reunion, are inconsolable, obsessed with the parent, and vacillate
between the need for closeness and anger at the parent. These children alternate
between angry, clingy behavior and passive resistance to physical contact. They can
be recognized by their anxious behaviors, and are often diagnosed with Attention
Deficit Disorder or Separation Anxiety. Children with insecure/avoidant attachment
show the most confusing, contradictory behaviors, marked by two conflicting drives:
approach and avoidance.
ENGLAND, supra note 32, at 45 (citing K. Reber, Children at Risk for Reactive Attachment
Disorder: Assessment Diagnosis and Treatment, 5 PROGRESS: FAM. SYS. RES. & THERAPY 83).
These conditions worsen with each subsequent placement and corresponding disturbance of
the child’s sense of security. Id. By the time a child has worked through the system, there is a
very good chance that they will develop one of these disorders. Id.
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systems and early parenthood” among children in the foster care system, linked to
their fragile psyches and the psychological stress of being in the foster care system.79
Yet, another study has indicated that the physical and mental problems of these
children may further deteriorate during their stay in the foster care system.80 One
study posited the following reasons for these problems:
These poor outcomes reflect a number of factors including ongoing
emotional trauma resulting from experiences of abuse and neglect prior to
care, inadequate support while in care, accelerated transitions to adulthood
and lack of guaranteed ongoing financial and other assistance to help
facilitate this transition. Young people leaving care do not currently
receive the ongoing support that a good parent would be expected to
provide for their children.81
The foster care system obviously poses a danger to children while they are in it—a
danger that should be avoided in favor of a safer outcome whenever available.
4. Long-Term Psychological Effects of Exposure to the Foster Care System
The long-term effects on children exposed to the foster care system are just as
devastating as the short-term effects. A study of persons formerly in foster care,
conducted in the United Kingdom, yielded disheartening results.82 The study found
that adults who were in the system as children were less likely than their peers who
had not been in the system to achieve high social status. 83 The study further found
that these adults were much more likely than their peers to be homeless, to have at
79
Philip Mendel & Badal Moslehuddin, From Dependence to Interdependence: Towards
Better Outcomes for Young People Leaving State Care, 15 CHILD ABUSE REV. 110, 110
(2006). Martin-Grissom noted similar effects of the system upon children:
Many researchers have noted the emotional and psychological outcomes related to
foster care placement. Dore and Eisner (1993), reported that adolescents in foster care
frequently present with five dimensions of problematic psychosocial functioning, each
of which reflect adverse early life experiences, (e.g., abuse, neglect, insecure early
attachments, and inconsistent care giving). The dimensions are: 1) inability to tolerate
intimacy, 2) impulsivity, 3) fear of rejection, 4) aggression and 5) low self esteem.
Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, at 32.
80

Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, at 43-44 (“While many children enter foster care with
significant health, mental health and developmental problems, the foster care system itself
may sometimes further exacerbate their problems.”); accord Russell M. Viner & Brent Taylor,
Adult Health and Social Outcomes of Children Who Have Been in Public Care: PopulationBased Study, 115 PEDIATRICS 894 (2005), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/
cgi/reprint/115/4/894.
81

Mendel & Moslehuddin, supra note 79, at 110.

82

See Viner & Taylor, supra note 80.

83

Id. at 896. This could be due to a number of factors:
[R]esearchers also reported children in foster care tend to have more difficulty with
relating to others (Fashel & Shinn, 1978; Garland et al. 1996; Hulsey & White, 1989;
Stein et al., 1996). Rest and Watson (1984) found that adults who had been in foster
care as children tended to have difficulty with intimate relationships, a higher
incidence of marital problems, and overall low self-esteem.
Martin-Grissom, supra note 31, at 37.
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least one criminal conviction, to suffer from psychological morbidity, and to have
poor overall health.84 Furthermore, men with a history in the system showed higher
rates of unemployment and histories of mental illness, while being less likely to
succeed in higher education.85 Finally, women with a history in the system had high
incidences of expulsion from school.86
The foster care system can have brutal effects on the children it is in place to
serve. These effects last long beyond the children’s exit from the foster care system.
The system is designed to protect them and give them a better life, but it fails too
often in this regard.
C. National Foster Care Statistics
Determining how long a child is likely to stay in the foster care system is a
complex calculation. A number of factors, including the race and age of the child, as
well as the status of the child’s health, might come into play.87 However, a number
of enlightening general figures are published by the Administration on Children,
Youth and Families, a subpart of the United States Department of Health and Human
Services’ Administration for Children and Families.88 An analysis of the data sheds
some light on the overexposure to the foster care system, especially for older
children.
1. The Age of Children in Foster Care
The Administration for Children and Families provides large amounts of data for
each fiscal year relative to trends and statistics in the foster care system nationwide
and for each state.89 According to the preliminary numbers for fiscal year 2004, the

84
Viner & Taylor, supra note 80, at 896. Martin-Grissom also speaks to the societal strain
caused by adults who are products of the foster care system: “In a study by Cook, Fleishman,
and Grimes (1991), which explored employment and economic stability, the authors found
that 40% of their former foster care participants were a ‘cost to the community’ at the time of
the interview, (e.g., on welfare, in jail, or on Medicaid) . . . .” Martin-Grissom, supra note 31,
at 39.
85

Viner & Taylor, supra note 80, at 896.

86

Id.

87

Infoplease: Adoption Trends, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0881281.html (last
visited April 8, 2008). Approximately 8% of adoptions are transracial and it is extremely
difficult to adopt a healthy white baby due to long waits. Id. Furthermore, children with
disabilities have trouble finding a home even though they need it most. Id.
88
See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN &
FAMILIES, CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES 2002: ANNUAL REPORT (2002).
89

See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN
& FAMILIES, THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2004 ESTIMATES AS OF JUNE 2006
(2006), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/tar/report
11.htm [hereinafter AFCARS 2004]; UNITED STATES DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, TIME BETWEEN TPR AND FINALIZATION (2005), available
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/statistics/time05.htm [hereinafter
TIME BETWEEN TPR AND FINALIZATION].
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mean90 age of children in the foster care system in 2004 was 10.1, while the median91
age was 10.9, with approximately 53% of children in the foster care system over the
age of ten.92 The mean age of entry for children in the foster care system was 8.3
years and the mean age of exit was 9.9 years.93 However, the average stay in the
system was 30.0 months, rather than the 1.6 years that would seem apparent given
the above numbers, with 18% of the stays lasting longer than three years.94
Furthermore, roughly half of the children who exited the foster care system were
under the age of ten, while roughly 37% of those exiting were between the ages of
fifteen and eighteen.95 Approximately 27% of the children in the foster care system
in 2004 had been in foster care for three or more years.96
2. Statistics Regarding Children Awaiting Adoption in the Foster Care System
The Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System Report
(“AFCARS Report”) also includes information specific to those children in the foster
care system awaiting adoption.97 The report indicates that approximately 65,000
children in foster care had parental rights terminated for all living parents in fiscal
year 2004 and that 118,000 children were awaiting adoption at the end of the fiscal
year; the mean years that these children had been in continuous foster care was 43.8
months. 98 Of these children who had been in continuous foster care, approximately
13% had been in continuous foster care for less than one year, 42% for two to three
years, and 45% for three or more years.99 On average, these children were five years
old when they were removed from the care of their parents or other caretakers, but
12% of these children were removed after the age of ten.100 Their average age was
8.8 years, with 36% between the ages of zero and five years, 25% between the ages

90

The mean of a group of numbers is essentially the average, found by adding all of the
numbers, then dividing this total by the total number of things. See, MCAS Math – Statistics
and Probability: Mean, Median, Mode and Range, http://www.dean.tec.ma.us/MCAS/
mcasmean.htm (last visited April 8, 2008).
91

The median of a group of numbers is found by listing all of the numbers in order and
finding the middle number, if you have an odd number of data, or averaging the middle two if
you have an even number of data. Id.
92

AFCARS 2004, supra note 89.

93

Id.

94

Id. Ten percent of the children who exited foster care in 2004 had been in the system for
three to four years, while 8% had been in the system for five years or more. Id.
95

See id. Also, note that of these, 8% are children who exited the system through
emancipation, not because they found a permanent placement. Id.
96

See id.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Id. For fiscal year 2004, 53,479 children had been waiting for adoption for three or more
years. Id.
100

Id.
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of six and ten years, and 34% over the age of ten.101 The average age of children
adopted from the public foster care system was 6.9 years, with roughly 67% of
children who were adopted out of the foster care system being under ten years of
age.102
Looking solely at national averages, it is apparent that there is a nationwide
problem in the foster care system. Far too many children are sitting in the system for
far too long. These children have precious little hope for a permanent home. Once a
child has been in the system more than three years or reaches the age of ten, or, even
worse, both, his likelihood of adoption out of the system has been greatly
diminished. Another door, any opportunity to find a loving, permanent home, must
be afforded to these children.
D. How Ohio Compares to the Rest of the Nation
An analysis of relevant statistical data to see how Ohio’s foster care statistics
compare to those of the rest of the United States can best be done by looking at a
report generated by the Administration for Children and Families.103 This report
gives data on the length of time between termination of parental rights and
finalization for October 1, 2003 to September 30, 2004, comparing data from all fifty
states as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.104 By looking to these
figures, the potential for long-term exposure to the foster care system in Ohio, and
elsewhere, can be readily identified.
1. Percentage of Children Reaching Finalization within Twelve Months of Entry into
Foster Care
In Ohio, 46% of children who had parental rights terminated reached finalization
within twelve months.105 While this figure may initially seem high, further analysis
reveals that thirty-six states, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, had
a higher percentage of children reach finalization in the first year,106 with Rhode
Island, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia leading the way with 85%, 84%, and
82% of children achieving finalization within the first twelve months, respectively.107
Two states tied Ohio in this respect, 108 and only eleven states109 had a lower

101
Id. Roughly 14,000 children fifteen years of age or older were awaiting adoption at the
end of fiscal year 2004. Id.
102

Id.

103

TIME BETWEEN TPR AND FINALIZATION, supra note 89.

104

Id.

105

See id.

106

See id.

107

Id.

108

Id. Florida and Oregon each had forty-six percent finalization within the first year. Id.

109

Alabama, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, South
Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia all had a lower percentage of children reach finalization
within the first year. Id. West Virginia was the lowest, with only 24% reaching finalization
within one year. Id.
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percentage of children reach finalization in less than one year.110 These data clearly
indicate that children who enter Ohio’s foster care system subsequent to termination
of parental rights are more likely to still be in the system in one year’s time than they
would be if they had entered the system in another jurisdiction.
2. Percentage of Children Reaching Finalization after Three or More Years in Foster
Care
Ohio’s already tarnished success rate drops even further as a child sits longer in
the system, making it among the worst states for children who do not reach
finalization until three or more years have elapsed, with 13% of children falling into
this category.111 Here, we find that forty-five states, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico now outperform Ohio by having a lower percentage of children reach
finalization during this time frame, 112 with Utah and Wisconsin tying for the lowest
percentage of children sitting in the system and waiting this long for finalization at
2%.113 This means that only four states have a higher percentage of children not
reach finalization until three or more years after termination of parental rights. 114 In
other words, that unfortunate child who enters Ohio’s foster care system hoping to
find a stable home is more likely than a child who enters in almost any other
jurisdiction to sit in the system for at least three years before leaving the system—
and not all of those leaving are leaving to a permanent home.
E. The Federal Government’s Assessment of Ohio’s Foster Care System’s
Performance
In addition to publishing the statistical data for each state, the federal government
also includes a section wherein it discusses how each state compares to the rest of the
nation and to its past performance in a number of categories which it deems
important.115 Of the seven categories considered by the federal government, five are
important to consider in this Note.116 Of these five, two relate to the physical safety

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

See id.

113

Id.

114

Maryland, Minnesota, New York, and Virginia all had a higher percentage of children
wait until three or more years had elapsed prior to finalization. Id. Minnesota had the highest
percentage at 16%. Id.
115
See UNITED STATES DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN &
FAMILIES, CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES 2003: OHIO, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/cwo03/state_data/ohio.htm.
116

This Note will not discuss Ohio’s performance in category four (“Reduce Time to
Reunification Without [sic] Increasing Re-entry”) as this Note deals more specifically with
cases where reunification with parents is not the ultimate goal. Id. Also, this Note will not
discuss Ohio’s performance in category seven (“Reduce Placements of Young Children in
Group Homes of Institutions”) as this does not directly speak to the problems discussed in this
Note. Id.
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of children in Ohio’s foster care system, while the other three relate to foster care
outcomes.117
The two outcomes that relate to physical safety of children in foster care deal
with reducing the incidence of abuse and neglect and reducing the recurrence of
abuse and neglect for children in the foster care system.118 When it comes to
reduction of the incidence of abuse and neglect, Ohio has both pros and cons—the
incidence of abuse is slightly less than the national median,119 but this “represents a
decline in performance from 2001 to 2003 . . . .”120 The figures look even more dim
when looking at the recurrence rates, as it is initially noted that more children in
Ohio who were “victims of maltreatment during the first 6 months of the year
experienced another maltreatment incident within a 6-month period . . .” than the
national median.121 Furthermore, the comments note that Ohio had a “relatively high
child maltreatment victim rate.”122
As to the program outcomes, Ohio again offers both good and bad results. On a
positive note, Ohio performed well on placement stability, which indicates that
children in Ohio’s foster care system may be less likely to have multiple
placements.123 Children awaiting adoption also tended to be more likely to reach
adoption within a twenty-four month period in Ohio than the national median.124
However, Ohio did not fare so well when it came to “[i]ncreas[ing] permanency for
children in foster care . . . .”125 Less children exiting the foster care system in Ohio
were leaving to a permanent home than the national median,126 and specifically, less
117
Id. Outcomes one and two relate to abuse and neglect of children in foster care, while
outcomes three, five, and six relate to permanency, time in foster care, and placement stability,
respectively. Id.
118

Id.

119

Id. In Ohio, “0.30 percent of the children in foster care were found to be maltreated by
a foster parent or facility staff member . . . [while] the national median [was] 0.39 percent . . .
.” Id.
120

Id.

121

Id. Ohio was at 8.4% recurrence, while the national median was 7.1%. Id.

122

Id. “In 2003, the child maltreatment victim rate in Ohio was 16.9 child victims per
1,000 children in the State population . . . the national median [was] 10.6 child victims per
1,000 children in the population.” Id. However, Ohio did improve over the period between
2000 and 2003, as the rate was 18.8 per 1,000 in 2000. Id.
123

Id.
85.9 percent of the children in foster care in Ohio for less than twelve months
experienced no more than two placement settings . . . which is slightly higher than the
national median of 84.2 percent. Also . . . 62.0 percent of the children in foster care
for at least 12 months, but less than 24 months, experienced no more than two
placement settings, which exceeds the national median of 59.1 percent.

Id.
124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Id. In Ohio, 83.1% of children exited to a permanent home, while the national median
was 86.3%. Id.
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children with disabilities who exited the system did so to a permanent home.127
Finally, children who entered the system after the age of twelve were even less likely
to leave to a permanent home.128
F. What Does This All Mean?
Clearly, the above data show a number of things. First of all, it demonstrates that
exposure to the foster care system can have negative effects on a child, including
developmental, emotional, physical, or mental effects. It also shows that children
who enter the system are apt to stay in the system. The longer that a child has been
in, or the later in his life that he enters the system, the less likely he is to leave the
system into a permanent home. The combination of these factors can lead to only
one conclusion: the law ought to provide as many means as possible to allow
children to escape from the system into a safe and permanent environment.
III. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK: OHIO AND BEYOND
A. Ohio Statutes and Rules
The Ohio Revised Code mandates protection of the best interests of children in a
plethora situations.129 There are currently no less than fifty-nine provisions of the
Ohio Revised Code that refer to the “best interest” of the child.130 These provisions
span various subject areas, from corporations131 and labor and industry,132 which
might not be as readily expected, to areas such as juvenile court proceedings133 and
domestic relations.134 The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure135 and the Ohio Rules of
Juvenile Procedure136 also indicate the deference given to the best interests of the
child. Furthermore, the local rules of multiple Ohio’s Courts of Common Pleas
make references to the best interest of the child.137 The theme is pervasive: the
General Assembly, through enacting the various sections of the Code cited above,
127
Id. In Ohio, 76.4% of the disabled children who exited foster care went to a permanent
home, while 79.5% was the national median for this same group. Id.
128

Id. In Ohio, 61.7% of children left to a permanent home, while the national median was
72.2%. Id.
129
See supra note 27 (listing some sections of the Ohio Revised Code that require the court
to consider the best interests of the child).
130

Id.

131

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1717.14 (LexisNexis 2007).

132

See, e.g., id. § 4109.06.

133

See, e.g., id. tit. 21.

134

See, e.g., id. tit. 31.

135

See, e.g., OHIO R. CIV. P. 75.

136

See, e.g., OHIO JUV. R. 4, 6, 9, 13, 14, 29, 34, 38.

137

See, e.g., OHIO CUYAHOGA COUNTY DOM. REL. DIV LR 32; OHIO FRANKLIN COUNTY
DOM. REL. DIV. LR 15, OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY DOM. REL. DIV. LR 2.1; OHIO
MONTGOMERY COUNTY DOM. REL. DIV. LR 4.29; OHIO STARK COUNTY FAM. CT. DIV. LR 17;
OHIO SUMMIT COUNTY DOM. REL. DIV. LR 26.
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has shown its sincere desire to protect the best interest of the children who must be
exposed to the legal system; the courts of this state are obligated to heed to their call
and utilize the auspices of their offices to further this protectionist scheme in the best
interests of the children that the courts are in place to serve.138
1. Termination of Parental Rights
Ohio has procedures to be followed when the state believes that termination of
parental rights is necessary.139 Termination of parental rights is generally a last
resort effort and is used to free a child for adoption.140 For example, the state must
make reasonable efforts to reunite the family prior to initiating a termination
proceeding.141 However, if those reasonable efforts are unsuccessful, the state must
proceed with termination proceedings.142
There are a number of procedural safeguards in place to protect the rights of
parents in a termination proceeding. These safeguards include such things as notice
to all necessary parties (which can be particularly difficult with unknown fathers)
and appointment of counsel for parents whose rights are being reviewed by the
court.143 While the court is to protect the rights and interests of the parents, the main
purpose of the proceeding is to protect the best interests of the child or children
involved.144
To this end, there are different events that may lead to termination of parental
rights in the state of Ohio. As a precursor, the court must first find that it would be
in the best interests of the child to have the parent’s rights terminated, and then the
occurrence of any one of four situations will allow termination of the parent’s
rights.145 First of all, if “the child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents
within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents[,]” the court
may enter an order terminating parental rights.146 Additionally, if the child has been
138

Gishwiler v. Dodez, 4 Ohio St. 615, 617 (Ohio 1855) (“[T]he order of the court should
be made with a single reference to [the child’s] best interests.”).
139

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.414, 2151.353 (LexisNexis 2007); see also
Cecilia Fiermonte & Jennifer L. Renne, Making it Permanent: Reasonable Efforts to Finalize
Permanency Plans for Foster Children 27-31 (Claire Sandt ed., 2002) (discussing, generally,
steps to aid in the termination of parental rights).
140
See FIERMONTE & RENNE, supra note 139, at 27 (“[T]erminat[ing] parental rights is the
first step toward adoption.”).
141
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414 (LexisNexis 2007); Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 748 (1982) (“At the factfinding hearing, the State must establish, among other
things, that for more than a year after the child entered state custody, the agency ‘made
diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship.’”) (quoting N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT §§ 614.1(c), 611 (McKinney 2006)).
142

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414 (B)(2) (LexisNexis 2007).

143

See id. §§ 2151.353 (I)(1)-(4), 2151.414 (A)(1); FIERMONTE & RENNE, supra note 139,
at 27-31.
144

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.353, 2151.414 (A)(1) (LexisNexis 2007).

145

See id. § 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(d); see also id. § 2151.353(A)(4).

146

Id. § 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss2/8

18

2008]

A PLEA FOR PERMANENCE AFTER TERMINATION

437

either abandoned or orphaned, with no relatives available to take permanent custody
of the child, the court may intervene.147 Finally, if “[t]he child has been in the
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child
placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month
period . . .[,]” the court may terminate parental rights.148
2. Procedures Subsequent to Termination of Parental Rights
In deciding McBride and holding that a parent whose parental rights have been
terminated may not subsequently petition for custody of that child,149 the Ohio
Supreme Court considered two Ohio Statutes.150 Ohio Revised Code Section
2151.353 requires the court to consider “the best interest of the child” in a number of
subsections,151 but subsection (E)(2), upon which the Court relied, does not direct the
courts to determine what is in the best interest of the child.152 Section 2151.414 is in
the same vein, containing several references to the best interest of the child,153 but the
best interests of the child are not considered by the subsection relied upon by the
Court.154 This Note will discuss the impact of Ohio Revised Code Section 2151.313
147

Id. § 2151.414(B)(1)(b)-(c).

148

Id. § 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

149

In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Ohio 2006), rev’g 817 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio Ct. App.

2004).
150

Id. The two statutes considered were sections 2151.353(E)(2) and 2151.414(F). Id.

151

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(A)(4), (C)(3) (LexisNexis 2007); see also
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(G)(1)(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2007) (referring to the “child’s
best interest”).
152

The text of the subsection is as follows:
Any public children services agency, any private child placing agency, the department
of job and family services, or any party, other than any parent whose parental rights
with respect to the child have been terminated pursuant to an order issued under
division (A) (4) of this section, by filing a motion with the court, may at any time
request the court to modify or terminate any order of disposition issued pursuant to
division (A) of this section or section 2151.414 or 2151.415 of the Revised Code. The
court shall hold a hearing upon the motion as if the hearing were the original
dispositional hearing and shall give all parties to the action and the guardian ad litem
notice of the hearing pursuant to the Juvenile Rules. If applicable, the court shall
comply with section 2151.42 of the Revised Code.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(E)(2) (LexisNexis 2007).
153

See, e.g., id. § 2151.414(A)(1), (B)(1)-(2).

154

The text of the subsection is as follows:
The parents of a child for whom the court has issued an order granting permanent
custody pursuant to this section, upon the issuance of the order, cease to be parties to
the action. This division is not intended to eliminate or restrict any right of the parents
to appeal the granting of permanent custody of their child to a movant pursuant to this
section.
Id. § 2151.414(F). The lack of reference to the best interest of the child in this section is
negligible in the analysis, however, since the quoted language is intended to apply at the time
of termination of parental rights, whereas this Note is concerned with a time in the future. The
recommendation below will account for the necessity of allowing the terminated parent to
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on the result in McBride and a recommendation of how to correct the statutory
language to prevent future injustice.155
While this statute, governing disposition of termination proceedings,156 certainly
aims to protect the best interest of the child during the proceedings and at the time of
the termination of parental rights, its treatment of the child’s best interests after the
termination is insufficient. Certainly in the vast majority of cases, a parent who has
had her parental rights terminated is not likely to ever come to the point in her life
where the child should be returned to her care. 157 But, what happens when a parent
does change,158 and the child is still left in a system that has failed him for years?
As the court in McBride noted, the disposition statute “specifically prohibits [the
parent whose rights have been terminated] from requesting a modification or
termination of permanent custody.”159 This result is undoubtedly mandated by the
statutory language, but is it the proper result for this matter? Justice Lanziger,
writing for a unanimous court, left an indication that it might not be the ideal
outcome, concluding his analysis by stating that the Court was simply “following the
statutes as they are written.”160 The court is limited in duty to interpreting the
statutes that the General Assembly promulgates and cannot of its own initiative
promulgate its own statutory scheme.161

reenter the litigation as a named party through the proposed revisions to section
2151.353(E)(2).
155

Ohio Revised Code Section 2151.353 is of little importance in this Note, as it deals with
the question of who may be party to an action. Its failure to protect the best interest of the
child in a matter such as this can quite easily be corrected by adopting the recommended
changes to the list of persons and entities who may petition for custody of a child after a
termination of parental rights, which are proposed below. Allowing the parent to enter into a
new proceeding in a manner analogous to that of adoption would make this a moot point.
Currently, Ohio law allows a party petitioning for adoption to file a petition “styled, ‘in the
matter of adoption of [name of child],’” thus, creating a new action, rather than filing under
the older action wherein the parental rights had been terminated, as Peggy Fugate had done.
Id. § 3107.04.
156

See id. § 2151.353.

157

Parental rights may be terminated for a number of reasons, including, inter alia, abuse,
neglect, and incarceration, and failure to follow a case plan developed by the local children’s
service agency. Id. § 2151.414.
158

Recall the Ohio Appellate judge’s assertion that “our court/justice/legal/moral system
supposes that people can change.” In re McBride, 817 N.E.2d 459, 461 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004),
rev’d, 850 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2006).
159

In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d 43, 46 (Ohio 2006), rev’g 817 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio Ct. App.

2004).
160

Id. at 47.

161

Id.
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3. The Best Interests of the Child
Several provisions of the Ohio Revised Code provide factors to be considered
when making a “best interest” determination.162 For example, section 2151.414(D)
lists factors for the court to consider when determining if termination of parental
rights is in the best interest of the child:
(1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers,
and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through
the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;
(3) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been
in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies
or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
consecutive twenty-two month period . . .;
(4) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody to the agency;
(5) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
apply in relation to the parents and child.
These types of factors can very easily be adapted to apply in the opposite
analysis—as factors to consider whether reinstatement of parental rights
would be in the best interest of the child.
B. Is Ohio Alone in Its Treatment of Parents Whose Rights Have Been Terminated?
All states have statutory mechanisms in place for termination of parental rights
and the procedures to be followed by the courts subsequent to termination of parental
rights. However, the rules governing these proceedings vary greatly. These types of
statutes and rules generally fall into one of three categories: those that do not allow a
parent to regain parental rights subsequent to termination, those that are silent or
unclear on the question, 163 and those that do allow a parent to regain parental rights
162

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414 (LexisNexis 2007) (setting forth a list of
factors to be considered when determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best
interests of the child or children involved); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (LexisNexis
2007) (setting forth a list of factors to be considered when determining whether shared
parenting is in the best interests of the child or children involved); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3109.051(LexisNexis 2007) (setting forth a list of factors to be considered when determining
whether an order granting parenting time or companionship time, or visitation rights are in the
best interests of the child or children involved).
163
These states will not be discussed in this Note, as their individual ambiguity lends no
clue as to the efficacy of statutes for and against reinstatement of parental rights. Included in
the states that do not speak of the issue or are too ambiguous to be interpreted as speaking to
the issue are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
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subsequent to termination. Statutes denying parents any future opportunity for
reinstatement of parental rights and those granting the opportunity for reinstatement
will be considered in turn.
1. Statutes Denying a Parent the Opportunity to Have Parental Rights Reinstated
There are a number of mechanisms used to bar a parent from regaining parental
rights once those rights have been severed. No fewer than ten jurisdictions 164 utilize
a clause denying the parent whose rights have been terminated “any right to object to
the adoption or otherwise participate in the adoption proceedings”165 as an initial
mechanism to deny a parent from re-entering the child’s life.166 Other states impose
a time limit for all challenges to orders terminating parental rights.167 At least one
state appears to deny a parent whose rights have been terminated any option to
challenge the ruling at all, aside from appellate review.168 One state denies courts the
power to set aside an order terminating parental rights.169 Oregon appears to have
one of the strictest statutes, which acts to strip the parent of standing for any type of
future proceeding regarding the child for whom the parent has been stripped of
parental rights by the court.170

Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South
Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
164

Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-606 (2007)), District of Columbia (D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-2361 (LexisNexis 2007)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-93 (2007)), Maine
(ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4056 (2007)), Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-611
(2007)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-29 (LexisNexis 2007)), North Carolina
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1112 (2007)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-46 (2007)),
Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-413 (2007)), and Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-317
(2007)).
165

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-317(b) (2007).

166

Remember that the process sought by Ms. Fugate’s attorney, which is practically
synonomous with the recommendation contained herein, argues for a proceeding similar to an
adoption proceeding. Statutes such as this could be argued as a bar to proceedings in this
nature.
167

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1108 (2007) (six months); N.D. CENT CODE § 2720-45 (2007) (30 days); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-7.2 (West 2007) (three months);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-21.1 (2007) (180 days); TEXAS FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.211 (Vernon
2007) (one year).
168

ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4038 (2007).

169

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.120 (LexisNexis 2007); but see § 128.160 (allowing a
parent whose rights have been terminated to petition the court to set aside a subsequent
adoption of that child).
170

OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.524 (2007).
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2. Statutes Permitting a Parent to Have Parental Rights Reinstated171
A select few jurisdictions allow a parent a method by which they may be able to
have parental rights reinstated. Each of these states has a slightly different approach
to the subject, although all have similar practical effects. These statutes are in some
ways analogous to the recommendations presented below, although none achieve
these results in the same way, nor as effectively.172
The first state to be considered is Tennessee.173 This is the most difficult of the
states to evaluate regarding a parent’s ability to have parental rights reinstated
subsequent to termination. To get to that point, two statutes must be considered.
First, remembering the analogy between reinstatement and adoption, the Tennessee
legislature has enacted a statute that provides that any party may file a petition for
adoption.174 Taken alone, this is hardly grounds for celebration. However, another
Tennessee statute makes it illegal for a person whose parental rights have been
terminated to obtain custody of the child “otherwise than by legal process.”175 Read
together, these statutes indicate that a parent whose parental rights have been
terminated has a legal procedure available to her, in the state of Tennessee, to have
her rights reinstated as to that child. However, this difficult use of two sections is a
weak point for a parent who truly desires to pursue this type of proceeding. While
Tennessee has taken some vague steps in the right direction, it has not quite solved
the problem.
The next instance of a state allowing a parent to regain parental rights subsequent
to termination presents an innovative approach to the problem, with a rule mirrored
by no other state. The California legislature enacted a statute containing the
following provision:
A child who has not been adopted after the passage of at least three years
from the date the court terminated parental rights and for whom the court
has determined that adoption is no longer the permanent plan may petition
the juvenile court to reinstate parental rights pursuant to the procedure
prescribed by Section 388.176
Accordingly, a child may petition for reinstatement of the parent’s rights in the
state of California, while the parent himself may not do so. Such a petition will be
considered in light of numerous statutory factors, including the likelihood of
adoption of the child and the need for permanency, related to the best interests of the
171
Most states do allow a state agency to petition for rights on behalf of a parent whose
rights have been terminated, however, such an occurrence is so unlikely to be pursued by the
state agency as to render it essentially a moot point.
172
This is true both because the recommendation is tailored specifically to the needs
arising under Ohio law and because the solution proposed herein is a more comprehensive
solution rather than a general statutory framework.
173

We will consider two Tennessee statutes, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-115 and 36-1-123
(2007).
174

Id. § 36-1-115.

175

Id. § 36-1-123.

176

CAL. FAM. CODE § 366.26(i)(2) (West 2007).
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child.177 Again, the legislature has taken a step in the right direction, but has failed to
reach a place that will truly protect the best interests of the child. This solution
necessarily requires the child to have to choose, prior to any inquiry into the best
interests of that child, that he would like to return to the care of a parent. However,
if the proceeding does not turn out in the child’s favor, the damage done to his
already fragile emotional state, caused by additional exposure to the court system, is
certainly not in that child’s best interests.
The legislature of Nevada has provided yet another interesting twist. As noted
above, Nevada law does not allow a court to set aside an order terminating parental
rights.178 However, the legislature does provide a mechanism whereby a parent who
has had their rights terminated may petition to have the court order terminating
parental rights set aside after a decree of adoption has been issued awarding custody
of the child to another party.179 At a hearing on a petition of this nature, the court is
compelled to look into whether returning the child to the biological parent would be
in the child’s best interests.180 This statute, however, fails to truly promise
permanency, as it allows the parent to interfere after the child has finally found
placement in a permanent home. A proceeding of this nature could have devastating
effects on the child’s mental and emotional health.
The North Dakota legislature shows both the recognition of the dangers of longterm exposure and understanding of the importance of permanency for the child, but
has implemented procedural safeguards to protect the child.181 Under this statute, the
“order terminating parental rights . . . may be vacated by the court upon motion of
the parent if the child is not on placement for adoption and the person having
custody of the child consents . . . .”182 These safeguards, while enacted with good
intentions, probably are not the most effective means of protecting the child’s best
interests. Under this statutory approach, if the child is up for adoption, even if the
chances for adoption are slim, the parent cannot intervene to save the child from the
system.183 Furthermore, the person having custody of the child, whose consent is
necessary for the parent to regain parental rights, may be biased against the parent,
since the custodian likely received custody of the child in the proceeding that
terminated the parent’s rights.184
The West Virginia legislature has demonstrated compassion for the best interests
of the children of its state by enacting a statute that allows for a parent to make a
motion to modify an order terminating parental rights.185 This statute requires the
177

Id.

178

See supra note 169.

179

See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.160 (LexisNexis 2007).

180

Id. The statute mandates a presumption that “remaining in the home of the adopting
parent is in the child’s best interest.” Id.
181

N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-37 (2007).

182

Id. (emphasis added).

183

Id.

184

Id.

185

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-6 (LexisNexis 2007). This section also allows the state
agency to make the petition. Id.
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moving party to demonstrate a change of circumstances warranting modification of
the previous order.186 The only apparent limitation upon this protection is that the
order “shall not be modified after the child has been adopted.”187 With this caveat,
the legislature has shown its understanding of the importance of permanency in a
child’s home life, however, it has not taken the comprehensive approach truly
necessary to correct this problem.
Finally, the statutory framework adopted by the Hawaii legislature appears to be
among the most in tune with the child’s best interest. The Hawaiian approach to the
problem at hand is sensitive to the needs of children in the system.188 The statute, in
relevant part, contains the following provision:
[A]t any time following the expiration of one year from the date of the
entry of any such judgment of termination of parental rights, upon the
motion of the parent or parents of the child or the department of human
services or any child-placing organization approved by the department or
any other proper person, based upon the fact that the child has not been
adopted or placed in a prospective adoptive home, the court in which the
judgment was entered shall review the same and shall consider the
currently reported circumstances of the child and of the parent or parents
and shall enter its findings as to whether the circumstances, and the
present best interests of the child, justify the continuance of the
judgment.189
This section grants the court the discretion to consider a number of best interests
factors, some of which are mandated in the statute itself, in determining if reuniting
the child with the parent is appropriate if the child has sat in the foster care system
for only a single year.190 Clearly, the Hawaiian legislature was aware of the dangers
of long-term exposure to the foster care system and was willing to recognize the
necessity of providing safeguards for the children of that state who must be exposed
to the foster care system.
IV. CASE LAW
The courts of Ohio have been called upon countless times to make
determinations regarding children and, in many of those instances, the best of
interests of children. The best interests of a child were first considered by the Ohio
Supreme Court over 120 years ago.191 Since that time, the Ohio Supreme Court has
shaped and defined the phrase through a multitude of judicial opinions. While the
186

Id.

187

Id.

188

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-63 (LexisNexis 2007).

189

Id.

190

Id.

191

Gishwiler v. Dodez, 4 Ohio St. 615, 617 (Ohio 1885) (“[T]he order of the court should
be made with a single reference to [the child’s] best interests.”). The case involved a custody
dispute, which the court resolved in favor of the mother of the child, over the father’s assertion
that he had the sovereign authority over his child. Id. Gishwiler is still cited for the
proposition that the best interests of the child should be paramount under Ohio law.
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composition of the Court has fluctuated, deference for the best interests of a child has
remained the same from 1885192 up through today.193
The application of the best interests concept has been seen in a number of
contexts, spanning from determination of parental rights and responsibilities amongst
parties to a divorce,194 to whether a child’s relatives should have visitation rights with
the child,195 and even to determination of whether a child’s surname should be
changed.196 Of particular significance to the issue at hand, the best interests of the
child are held by the Ohio Supreme Court to be of the utmost importance in
determining whether termination of parental rights is appropriate under the
circumstances.197 One Ohio Supreme Court Justice has even gone so far as to write
that “[t]he ultimate responsibility is on the judge to proceed in the best interests of
the children.”198 Clearly, the Ohio Supreme Court considers children’s best interests
to be a crucial inquiry.
When faced with the case of Selina McBride, however, the Ohio Supreme Court
did not consider her best interests. Selina came before the Ohio Supreme Court at
the culmination of a long, sad story, beginning in a courtroom where her mother’s
parental rights were terminated and finding its way back into the courts when her
mother tried to save her from a life of perpetual confinement to a system that had
192

See, e.g., id.

193

See, e.g., Children’s Home of Marion County v. Fetter, 106 N.E. 761, 766 (Ohio 1914)
(“The presumption is that the juvenile court of Marion county, when it committed Howard
Fetter to the Children's Home, was acting with reference to the best interests and welfare of
the child.”); Trickey v. Trickey, 106 N.E.2d 772, 774 (Ohio 1952) (“[The trial judge]
evidenced sincere concern for the welfare and best interests of the child and acted only after
deliberation.”); In re Cunningham, 391 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Ohio 1979) (“Such an
interpretation of the statute is consistent with the time-honored precedent in this state that the
‘best interests’ of the child are the primary consideration in questions of possession or custody
of children.”); In re Schaefer, 857 N.E.2d 532, 538 (Ohio 2006) (“A court must conclude by
clear and convincing evidence that an assignment of permanent custody is in the best interest
of the child.”).
194
See, e.g., Kelm v. Kelm, 749 N.E.2d 299, 303 (Ohio 2001) (“With respect to matters of
custody and visitation, the central focus is not, as appellant suggests, the rights of the parents
but is, rather, the best interests of the children.”).
195
See, e.g., Harrold v. Collier, 836 N.E.2d 1165, 1172 (Ohio 2005) (“The court ultimately
decided that Brittany's best interests in maintaining her relationship with [her grandparents]
outweighed [her parent’s] desire for no visitation.”).
196

See, e.g., In re Willhite, 706 N.E.2d 778, 782 (Ohio 1999) (“We hold that when
deciding whether to permit a name change for a minor child pursuant to R.C. 2717.01(A), the
trial court must consider the best interest of the child in determining whether reasonable and
proper cause has been established.”).
197

See, e.g., In re C.W., 818 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ohio 2004) (“[B]efore a court can grant
permanent custody to the moving agency, it must ‘determine[e] . . . , by clear and convincing
evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to
the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody . . . .’”) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.414(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2007)).
198

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Karto, 760 N.E.2d 412, 420 (Ohio 2002) (Pfeifer, J.,
dissenting).
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failed her on so many occasions.199 Little Selina had spent most of her life in the
system, a system that her mother had believed was the safest option for the child.200
However, time passed and the system failed to achieve a permanent placement for
Selina, but instead placed her in a group home.201 She ran away frequently and had
trouble with the law on occasion.202 Her mother wanted to save her from this
negative lifestyle, so she petitioned the Juvenile Court for custody of her daughter.203
Selina’s safety and interests apparently were at the forefront of the Juvenile Court’s
analysis, as it ruled that Peggy should at least be allowed the opportunity to present
her argument as to why granting custody of Selina to Peggy would be in the child’s
best interests.204
The appellate court agreed with the decision of the juvenile court, which had
decided the case under its mistaken belief that there was no statute or precedent to
guide in the decision.205 The appellate court remembered the importance of the best
interests of the child in the judicial scheme, stating that, “[i]n hearing her petition,
the court will focus primarily on the events of the past seven years, and, most
importantly, on what will now be in Selina's best interests.”206 The appellate court
would have allowed Fugate the opportunity to at least present evidence that a life
with her was in Selina’s best interest.207 Up until this point in the case, the judicial
system had acted in a manner consistent with its tradition of protecting, above all
else, the best interests of the children for whom it was in place to serve.
The Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion in McBride lacks that magic little phrase. 208
The Ohio Supreme Court held that Fugate was not allowed even the opportunity to
attempt to convince the Juvenile Court that Selina’s best interests should be
considered, regardless of the party asking it to do so.209 Why the discrepancy? The
Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion rests on an application of two sections of the Ohio
Revised Code.210 These sections of the Ohio Revised Code govern disposition of
199

See generally In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2006), rev’g, 817 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2004); see also Coolidge, Daughter She Lost, supra note 1.
200

See Coolidge, Remade Life, supra note 8.

201

Id.

202

Id.

203

In re McBride, 817 N.E.2d 459, 461 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 850 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio

2006).
204

Id.

205

Id.

206

Id. (emphasis added).

207

Id. at 462.

208

In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2006), rev’g, 817 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio Ct. App.
2004). The court barred Peggy from petitioning for custody of her daughter based on an
analysis of two statutes, neither of which required, or even suggested, that the court consider
the best interests of the child. Id.
209

Id. at 47.

210

Id. at Syllabus. For a full discussion of the statutory scheme, see supra Part III.
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abused, neglected, or dependent children211 and procedures upon motion for
permanent custody of a child.212 The first section is cited by the Ohio Supreme Court
as barring Fugate’s attempt to petition for custody of her daughter because she is not
on the statutory list of persons and entities who may make such a petition.213 The
second section is cited for the proposition that Fugate was a non-party to the action,
and therefore, lacked standing to file the petition in the Juvenile Court under the
original case number.214 On the basis of these two statutes, the Court “h[e]ld that a
parent who has lost permanent custody of a child does not have standing as a
nonparent to file a petition for custody of that child.”215
Where, though, did the best interests fall to the wayside? The Ohio Supreme
Court had a tremendous track record, spanning over 120 years, of protecting the best
interests of children who unfortunately had found their way into the court system.216
Yet, when it came time to decide McBride, the Ohio Supreme Court was silent on the
best interests of Selina.217 Never once did the Court say in the opinion that the
outcome would protect the best interests of Selina or that the statute was designed to
protect the best interests of Selina.218 This is because the Court is in place to
interpret the laws as given to them.219 The above discussion of the statutory language
shows that, indeed, the Ohio Supreme Court was bound by the language of the
statutes involved, and the outcome, while tragic, was probably right.220 This is not a
problem that should be corrected by the courts; this problem can only be corrected
by the Ohio General Assembly through statutory reform.

211

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353 (LexisNexis 2007).

212

Id. § 2151.414.

213

In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 46 (applying OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(E)(2)
(LexisNexis 2007)). The statute lists multiple entities and any person who has not had
parental rights terminated as parties who may petition for custody after a termination of
parental rights has occurred. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(E)(2) (LexisNexis 2007).
214
In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 45 (applying OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(F)
(LexisNexis 2007)). The statute removes a parent whose rights have been terminated as a
party to the action, thus, that parent cannot make a motion under the original case number.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(F) (LexisNexis 2007).
215

In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 47.

216

See supra notes 191 & 194.

217

In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 47.

218

Id.

219

Id. at 47.

220

See supra Part III.
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V. THE SOLUTION221
The statutory structure that exists in Ohio at this time fails to fully protect
children from the dangers inherent in the foster care system.222 The courts cannot
protect the children because they are bound to follow the statutes as written.
Therefore, one must look to the Ohio General Assembly for relief from this problem.
Statutory reform can be implemented in such a way that it protects the best interest
of children by carefully considering every opportunity to find a permanent placement
for the child, regardless of the identity of the person moving for custody. By
allowing children the greatest number of options, while still considering what is in
the best interest of these children, it is possible to save children from over exposure
to the foster care system.223
The first step that the legislature needs to take is to eliminate the phrase “other
than any parent whose parental rights with respect to the child have been terminated
pursuant to an order issued under division (A)(4) of this section” from Ohio Revised
Code § 2151.353(E)(2).224 The statute, thus rewritten, would allow a parent who has
turned her life around to at least have her interest in regaining custody of her child
considered by the court in light of the child’s best interests, rather than barring her
attempt simply because she once lost essentially the same rights that she is now
asking the court to grant to her. However, there need to be restraints in place in
order to effectively allow only rehabilitated parents to ask the court to consider their
suitability as a parent to the child over which they no longer retain parental rights.225
There should be a number of conditions precedent to a parent’s filing of a petition for
custody, or adoption, of the child which must all be met prior to initiation of any
221

While this solution is aimed specifically at redressing the Ohio Revised Code’s
shortcomings relative to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in McBride, these principles and
examples could easily be applied in a multitude of other jurisdictions, as discussed in Part III
of this Note.
222

See generally supra Parts II & III.

223

In theory, even if only one child is saved from the dangers of the system, this system
has been successful.
224

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(E)(2) (LexisNexis 2007). The revised subsection in
full would then read as follows:
Any public children services agency, any private child placing agency, the department
of job and family services, or any party, by filing a motion with the court, may at any
time request the court to modify or terminate any order of disposition issued pursuant
to division (A) of this section or section 2151.414 or 2151.415 of the Revised Code.
The court shall hold a hearing upon the motion as if the hearing were the original
dispositional hearing and shall give all parties to the action and the guardian ad litem
notice of the hearing pursuant to the Juvenile Rules. If applicable, the court shall
comply with section 2151.42 of the Revised Code.
Id. (with language omitted to reflect the proposed changes).
225

While some might argue that a best interests hearing would effectively eliminate the
need for the proposed restraints, the author believes that these are a more effective tool to
prevent a parent from beginning proceedings that will be unsuccessful and, thus, having an
emotional and psychological effect on the child that may create lasting damage. Furthermore,
these can reduce the potential strain on the judicial system by limiting the number of full best
interest hearings.
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proceedings, as well as certain guidelines that the court must keep in mind when
ruling on these sensitive matters.
First, there must be no other person or entity in the process of adopting the child.
This provision ensures that the child avoids being put in the ominous position of
having to choose between a parent and some other person or entity, which would be
strenuous on the child’s already burdened psyche, while promoting stability.
Furthermore, the reason that this reform is necessary is to avoid long-term exposure
to the foster care system for these children; if another person is moving to adopt that
child, it is less likely that the child will be in the system for an extended period of
time. Immediately upon dismissal or termination of the other party or entity’s action,
the parent would be able to make her motion.
Additionally, there should be a statutory minimum number of years that the child
must have been continuously in the foster care system without finding a permanent
home before a parent may file her petition for custody. This provision would help to
ensure that children at the highest risk for the dangers of the foster care system, due
to long-term exposure, would be able to find a home with a parent who has had time
to correct the problems in her life. The author recommends a minimum of three
years.226
On top of that, there must be a statutory minimum period that the parent can
prove that she has turned her life around and corrected the problems that led to the
termination of her parental rights. This additional provision helps to ensure that the
parent has shown a sincere dedication to correcting her life and has not simply
cleaned up for a short-term period once the child has been in the system for the
minimum number of years. The author recommends a minimum of eighteen months
for this requirement. The parent should be required to set forth facts and evidence to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that this requirement is met. Evidence to
this effect could include, inter alia, proof of steady employment and income,
completion of treatment for drug or alcohol abuse, steady habitation of a place of
residence, or an ongoing commitment to other members of the parents’ family such
as a spouse or significant other, the parents’ other children, or the children of a
spouse or significant other.227
If all of these conditions are fulfilled, the court should move on to an analysis of
whether returning to the parent’s care would be in the child’s best interest. At this
stage, one final limitation must be recognized: the parent should receive no deference
simply due to her status as biological parent of the child. The court could then
proceed to a best interest determination using factors such as those found in Ohio
Revised Code Section 2151.414(D).228

226

See supra Part III.E.1, stating that thirteen percent of Ohio’s children do not reach
finalization until after they have been in the foster care system three or more years.
227
This is in no manner intended to be an exhaustive list, but rather a few indicative factors
that the author finds relevant.
228
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(D) (LexisNexis 2007). This statute provides the
following factors to be considered when evaluating the best interests of the child when
determining whether termination of parental rights is appropriate:
(1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings,
relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child;
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This language could be easily inserted into the statute as subsection (E)(3), which
could be written as follows:
(3)(a) With respect to division (E)(2), if the party moving for custody is a
parent whose parental rights with respect to the child have been
terminated pursuant to an order issued under division (A)(4) of this
section, the following conditions must be met before the court may
proceed with the motion:
(i) No other person or entity may be in the process of seeking custody of
the child;
(ii) The child must have been in state custody for at a minimum of three
consecutive years; and
(iii) The parent must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he has
corrected the problems that led to termination of his parental rights and
continued to live free of these problems for a minimum of eighteen
months.
(b) If the court finds the conditions in division (E)(3)(a) to be met, it then
shall proceed to a hearing to determine whether a change in custody is in
the best interest of the child. In making the determination, the court shall
consider the following factors:
(i) No special treatment shall be afforded to the child’s biological parent
based solely on his status as biological parent of the child;
(ii) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's
parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers,
and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(iii) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child, an attorney
for the child, or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for
the maturity of the child;
(iv) The custodial history of the child, including the length of time that the
child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children
(2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's
guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;
(3) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child
placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period
. . .;
(4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of
placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency;
(5) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in
relation to the parents and child.
Id.
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services agencies or private child placing agencies, the number of foster
care placements the child has had, and the amount of time spent in each
placement;
(v) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether
that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent
custody to the petitioner;
(vi) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
apply in relation to the parent and child; and
(vii) Any other factor the court considers important in determining the
best interests of the child.229
VI. CONCLUSION
Ohio’s statutory scheme does not adequately protect children from the
dangers of the foster care system.230 By implementing the recommendations
contained herein, the Ohio General Assembly could correct this deficiency and allow
the courts to serve their intended purpose of protecting the best interests of the
children they serve.231 Allowing a parent who has had her parental rights terminated
an opportunity to petition for the right to become a part of her child’s life after the
parent has cleaned up her life and the child has had to suffer through several years in
a foster care system that has failed him, the legislature would be protecting a fragile
and vulnerable segment of the children in the foster care system who may be doomed
to spend its entire childhood in the homes of strangers. Summarily denying a
permanent home to a child in foster care solely based upon the identity of the person
trying to give that child a home goes against the fundamental principles of the legal
system. Children like Selina McBride deserve the chance to find out if a parent, like
Peggy Fugate, who has changed her life and created a happy, loving home might be
in their best interest.

229
The newly created subsection regarding factors relevant to determination of the child’s
best interests are an adaptation of the best interest factors found in Ohio Revised Code Section
2151.414(D).
230

See generally supra Parts II & III.

231

See generally supra Part V.
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